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http://intl.elsevierhealth.com/journals/ijidThe paper ‘‘The effects of annual widespread badger culls
on cattle tuberculosis following the cessation of culling’’ by
Jenkins, Woodroffe, and Donnelly (Int J Infect Dis 2008;12:
[doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2008.04.001]) adds a further interesting
twist to what is already one of the most thought-provoking
epidemic studies of recent years — the UK government
commissioned Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT),
aimed at assessing potential strategies for controlling bovine
TB in cattle.
In a recent interview, the former UK Chief Scientific
Adviser David King repeated his view that ‘‘since trials proved
that cattle got TB from badgers, a badger cull was advisa-
ble’’.1 This attitude represents a backward step of 30 years.
It was precisely because this simple logic had failed — culling
badgers over a 25-year period had failed to check the spread
of the disease — that the RBCT was set up in 1998.
The disease situation is complex, with the two interacting
populations of cattle (difficult to diagnose) and badgers
(difficult to count); a variety of possible routes of transmis-
sion between them, of unknown relative importance; and a
range of possible control strategies, including cattle testing,
movement controls, biosecurity, and vaccination (of either or
both species), as well as the badger culling on which the trials
focused.
In contrast, the experimental setup was one of classical
statistical simplicity — a randomized trial comparing three
strategies, each implemented in 10 areas — though necessa-
rily on a large scale: 5 years of experiment on 30 areas each of
100 km2, at a cost of over £30 million (GBP). Because of the
controversy surrounding badger culling, an independent
scientific group (ISG) was set up to oversee the RBCT and
analyze its results, the specifically statistical work being
overseen by Sir David Cox and Christl Donnelly.
The key results were surprising to believers in simple
mathematical models, though less so to ecologists. It was
found that the reactive strategy, of localized badger culling
whenever a new herd of cattle was found to be infected, had
a significant detrimental effect, increasing disease inci-
dence. The proactive strategy, in which the badger popula-
tion over a whole 100 km2 trial area was kept at as low as
feasible a level by culling, had a beneficial effect within the
trial area, but a significant detrimental effect just outside
the area. Also, the proportion of infected badgers increased
within the proactive trial areas, despite the population1201-9712/$32.00 # 2008 International Society for Infectious Diseases.
doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2008.07.001density being much lowered. All these detrimental effects
are well explained by the hypothesis that culling disrupts the
badgers’ territorial structure, causing them to disperse more
widely and make more infectious contacts, a hypothesis that
has been supported by detailed studies using marked baits.
The ISG’s final report in 20072 concluded that only the
proactive strategy could have a beneficial effect, and that
only if carried out to a high standard over an area of at least
several hundred square kilometres. Further, the cost of this
would be an order of magnitude higher than the benefit, so
they concluded that ‘‘badger culling cannot meaningfully
contribute to the control of cattle TB in Britain’’. In coming
to this view, the ISG took account of the existence of alter-
native control strategies; indeed work by Cox et al.3 esti-
mated that the reproductive ratio of the disease needs only
to be decreased by about 10%, which should be achievable by
a variety of control measures, for example by increasing test
frequency.
So much for the science. The ISG’s report was then sub-
jected to a brief review4,5 by the then Chief Scientific
Adviser, Sir David King, together with an ‘expert group’ —
expert indeed on the biological side, but inadequate on the
statistical or epidemic modeling side vital to assessing the
ISG’s work. That this review of the long considered advice of a
distinguished and independent expert group took place at all
is a matter of concern. It might have been justified if it had
taken a wider remit, considering alternative control strate-
gies and their costs, but instead it took a narrower remit,
ignoring economics. Also, worst of all, this review took place
in secret, without any contact with the ISG that might have
allowed its half-baked analysis to be discussed and improved
before it was taken out of the oven.
Such behaviour is a serious deterrent to good scientists
from taking the time to work with and advise government.
The basic ingredients for science-based policy must be inde-
pendence and trust; those who give their time must feel that
if their advice is not taken, it is either for scientific reasons,
which they have opportunity to discuss, or for reasons beyond
their remit, perhaps social or political.
Fortunately on this occasion a cross-party group of
politicians provided what the Chief Scientific Adviser could
not — a balanced review of the ISG’s advice in the wider
context. The parliamentary Select Committee on Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs, after taking evidence fromPublished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
456 Editorialthe ISG, David King, and others, came out with a report in
February 2008.6 This report, while allowing that under rigor-
ously defined conditions badger culling might contribute,
recommended that priority be given to a rangeof other control
options. Following this, theMinister,HilaryBenn,announced in
July 20087 that the government would not be allowing badger
culling, instead setting early target dates for vaccines for both
cattle and badgers, and seeking to work with farmers on
tighter cattle controls and biosecurity.
Against this background, Jenkins et al.’s new paper pro-
vides an intriguing twist. They have followed up disease
incidence after the culling stopped. It might have been
feared that the situation would have deteriorated, with a
perturbed population no longer kept down by culling.
Instead, they find that, over the first year or two after the
trial ended, the beneficial effect increased within the proac-
tive trial areas, while the detrimental effect just outside
them was reversed. The explanation is perhaps that the
perturbed behaviour is ceasing quite quickly, with territorial
behaviour restored to normal, while the population is still
well below its original level. If this is correct, one might
expect the beneficial effect to decay until the trial areas are
no different from their surroundings once the badger popula-
tion level is back to normal, which might take of the order of
10 years. That would give a considerable improvement in the
cost—benefit ratio of proactive culling, though probably not
enough to make it economically attractive; it should also be
noted that the benefits are delayed, being greatest more
than 5 years after culling starts.
It is to be hoped that more interesting results will emerge
as the follow-up studies continue. Opportunities to conduct
epidemiological experiments on such a grand scale are neces-
sarily rare. Given the complexities of multi-host diseases, the
RBCT would have been well worthwhile if it had just con-
firmed what was expected. Its unexpected results are part of
the excitement of science, as is the aspect that it probably
raises more interesting questions than it has solved. It shouldinform and stimulate research on many other multi-popula-
tion diseases.
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